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CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY UNDER MARITIME AND LOUISIANA LAW
The production of oil and gas from the ocean bottom is a complex
and dangerous activity. This major industry,' combining the risks in-
herent in the drilling field with the perils of the sea, has been recog-
nized as a maritime activity! Men and women who provide the many
services required to produce oil and gas upon the navigable waters
of the United States are maritime workers subject to admiralty law.3
When a maritime worker is injured either on a vessel or on a fixed
platform beyond 3 miles offshore, his rights are regulated by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.4 Beyond the
employer-employee relationship, however, are other relationships
necessary to the successful undertaking of oil and gas production.
Many workers go to vessels and platforms because their employers
have executed contracts with the owners to provide needed services.
Allocation of risk is an important element of these service contracts
in this exceedingly dangerous field. Workers must be transported by
vessels or helicopters to drilling locations. Vessels and fixed platforms
are vulnerable to high waves and strong winds, and workers are fre-
quently injured or killed through accidents and explosions. These risks,
which are the same whether the worker is on a vessel or fixed plat-
form, are compounded by the confusion resulting from the owner's
and the contractor's shared control over the operations. The owners,
generally in the more powerful bargaining position, shift their poten-
tial liability for any losses to the service contractors through indem-
nity agreements.
Copyright, 1982 by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. "Precise figures are hard to come by, but perhaps as many as 40,000 employees
are currently directly or indirectly involved in oil and gas exploration and production
from United States-owned rigs." Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A
Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 973, 973 (1977).
2. Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 664 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1981); Pip-
pen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. "The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operation ....
but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel . . .
" Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 S
948(a), 33 U.S.C. S 902(3) (1978). Maritime workers who are masters or members of
a crew of a vessel are governed by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1970), rather than
the Longshoremen's Act. A worker injured on a fixed platform located within three
miles from the shores of Louisiana is within the territorial waters of the state and
will generally be covered by the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
4. 33 U.S.C. §5 903-950 (1978).
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The Indemnity Agreement
An indemnity agreement in a service contract determines which
party will bear losses incurred during the performance of the contract.'
The law that governs the obligations of the underlying contract also
controls the scope and validity of any indemnity agreement contained
therein.' Therefore, before the legal effect of the indemnity provision
can be determined, the contract must be classified as one governed
either by maritime law or state law.
Properly categorizing a contract as one governed by maritime law
or state law has become even more important since the passage of
Act 427 of the 1981 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature.7
Before this legislation, the general principles applicable to maritime
and Louisiana indemnity agreements, with a few narrowly drawn ex-
ceptions, were essentially the same. Under the new legislation, in-
demnity agreements receive very distinct treatment, depending upon
whether they are contained in maritime contracts or nonmaritime con-
5. An indemnity contract is:
[a] contract between two parties whereby the one undertakes and agrees to in-
demnify the other against loss or damage arising from some contemplated act
on the part of the indemnitor, or from some responsibility assumed by the in-
demnitee, or from the claim or demand of a third person, that is, to make good
to him such pecuniary damage as he may suffer.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (5th ed. 1979).
A hold harmless agreement is "[a] contractual arrangement whereby one party
assumes the liability inherent in a situation, thereby relieving the other party of respon-
sibility .. " Id. at 658.
6. Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1981). Similarly,
courts have generally held that admiralty jurisdiction will not extend to torts arising
out of a nonmaritime contract. Hollister v. Luke Construction Co., 517 F.2d 920 (5th
Cir. 1975); Alfred v. MIV Margaret Lykes, 398 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1966); Frankel v.
Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 132 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1942). But cf. Dilorenzo v.
Robert E. Lee, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. La. 1976) (shipbuilder has a maritime
claim for negligence against the vessel, even though the shipbuilding contract itself
is not maritime); Lundy v. Litton Systems, Inc., 624 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1980) (although
a shipbuilding contract is nonmaritime, a maritime negligence action against a vessel
which is 95/0 complete is allowed under S 905(b) of the LHWCA). Regardless of whether
the underlying tort is maritime or nonmaritime, the contractual indemnity provision
will be interpreted in accordance with the law which governs the underlying contract.
7.
AN ACT To amend Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding
thereto a new Section, to be designated as R.S. 9:2780, to provide for the in-
validity of certain indemnity agreements affecting industries engaged in the
development, exploration, and exploitation of sources of energy; to provide for
exceptions thereto; to provide for the applicability of the Act; and otherwise to
provide with respect thereto.
1981 La. Acts., No. 427 (1981).
[Vol. 43
NOTES
tracts. Unless there is a reasonable basis for inconsistent treatment,
parties to indemnity agreements should not be subject to different
law based simply upon whether the contract is maritime or non-
maritime. In many factual situations, however, although there is no
reasonable basis for inconsistent treatment, the enforceability of the
indemnity agreement does depend solely upon classification of the
contract.
Indemnity agreements have been the source of much confusion
and litigation in both maritime law and Louisiana law. The confusion
arises because these indemnity agreements bring into conflict two
equally weighty principles of law, resulting in judicial decisions which
are often legally unsatisfactory and at times inequitable.
One of these principles is the basic foundation of tort law: a per-
son should have freedom to act, but when his acts cause harm to
another, he must repair the loss.8 This liability usually arises from
negligence on the part of the actor. However, it may be imposed by
operation of law, such as through vicarious liability9 or strict liability,"
even in the absence of negligence on the part of the one held
responsible.
The rationale behind this tort principle is both practical and
ethical. When a person can shift his negligence onto another, there
is no financial motive for him to engage in activities in the safest
and least wasteful manner. For example, if the indemnitee retains
control over the performance of the contract, he might consider only
maximum efficiency and profit and disregard potential injury or other
damages which may result from his method of operations. If, however,
indemnification against his own negligence is not allowed, the pru-
dent employer will consider risk of injury as well as efficiency and
profit, thereby avoiding a potential accident.
Insurance permits a person to shift the greater portion of liability
for his own negligence to an insurance company. The upholding of an
insurance policy, however, should not encourage the insured to be
negligent. The risk of an insured suffering a financial loss due to his own
8. This principle is illustrated by LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315: "Every act whatever
of man which causes harm to another obliges him by whose fault it occurred to repair it."
9. Vicarious liability is illustrated by LA. CiV. CODE art. 2320: "Masters and
employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers,
in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.
10. Strict liability arises in situations where the one held liable was not negligent,
e.g., LA. CIv. CODE art. 2322: "The owner of a building is answerable for the damage oc-
casioned by its ruin when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the
result of a vice in its original construction."
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negligence is far greater than that of a company which shifts its liability
for negligence to the contractor he has hired. In many instances, an in-
sured will have to pay higher premiums once he has been negligent; if
his negligent behavior is serious or recurring, he may not be able to ob-
tain insurance at all. Frequently, a portion of the loss must be borne by
the insured before he is entitled to recover from the insurance."
In contrast to the insurance policy is the indemnity agreement
between the large and powerful oil company or vessel owner and the
smaller contractor, who in most instances has no opportunity to
bargain as to the terms of the contract. While the more powerful party
to an insurance contract is the insurer, the more powerful party to
an indemnity agreement in a service contract is the insured, or the
indemnitee. Of course, if a particular company continually causes losses
by its own negligence and shifts that negligence to the contractors,
there is the possibility that contractors might cease to enter into con-
tracts with that company. Because of the intense competition of the
contractors in this industry, however, this would be a more unusual
situation than that of the careless driver who cannot obtain insurance
from the more powerful insurance company.
The principle that a person should be responsible for the damages
he causes is supported by an ethical consideration as well. A person
should not be able to shift legally imposed liability to someone else.
Arguably, justice is something more than a large settlement coming
from an anonymous source, and the one who causes the harm should
bear the burden of the loss.
Balanced against this basic tenet of tort law is the legal principle
that persons should be free to contract with each other. They should
be allowed within certain parameters to structure their private
transactions.12 Certain contracts, however, are void as against public
policy" and thus unenforceable in courts of law. Generally, indemnity
agreements are not invalid per se. But in some instances, indemnity
agreements have been declared per se null." This inconsistent treat-
ment in legally indistinguishable situations illuminates the difficulty
11. "There is a clause in insurance policies which provides that the insurance com-
pany will pay only that amount of any loss that is in- excess of a specified amount.
That specified amount is the deductible." M. KEIM, GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE LANGUAGE
29 (1978).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 11 provides that individuals can contractually renounce what
the law has established in their favor "when the renunciation does not affect the rights
of others and is not contrary to the public good."
13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 12 provides: "Whatever is done in contravention of a pro-
hibitory law, is void, although the nullity be not formally directed."
14. See text at notes 56 & 137, infra.
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courts face in choosing between the values, promoted by the two ap-
plicable principles of law.
A Hypothetical Contract
For the purpose of focusing on the problems involved in classify-
ing contracts and analyzing indemnity agreements, consider the follow-
ing hypothetical. This problem should illustrate the distinctions in
treatment a maritime contract and a nonmaritime contract will receive,
even when the same parties and similar tasks are involved in each.
A welding contractor agrees to perform services on a submersi-
ble drilling rig15 located in the Gulf of Mexico. Later that day, he con-
tracts to perform services on a fixed drilling platform located five
miles offshore. The same person owns both the submersible drilling
rig and the fixed platform. In addition, both agreements contain a
provision in which the contractor promises to indemnify the owner
against any claims arising out of the performance of the welding job,
regardless of whether the injuries are the result of the fault of the
owner-indemnitee.
The owner of the two rigs also owns a Louisiana factory which
manufactures automobile tires. Upon completion of the obligations im-
posed by the two offshore service contracts, the welder performs
welding services in this Louisiana plant, pursuant to a contract similar
to the two described above.
Different law governs each of these three agreements. The con-
tract to perform services on the submersible rig is a maritime con-
tract for work upon a vessel which must be interpreted in accordance
with federal admiralty principles." The contract to perform services
15. Moveable drilling platforms, called submersible rigs or "jack-up" rigs, are
vessels. Wilkerson v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (E.D.
Tex. 1980).
16. In one case, however, the Fifth Circuit held that the negligent performance
of workover operations on a well, while aboard a submersible drilling barge resting
on the bottom of a dead-end dredged canal slip in Louisiana and which resulted in
property damages, was not a maritime tort. Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal
States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981). The court stated that although
arguably the barge was a vessel, there was no significant relationship to maritime
activity. "This case which involves a well blowout in a dead-end canal slip in Loui-
siana is simply not of such a character that leaving the parties to pursue state law
remedies would distrub the federal interest of maintaining the uniformity of maritime
law." Id. at 1138. Presumably, a contract to perform the workover operations on the
well would not be maritime either, even though performance required use of the dril-
ling barge. In light of Pippen and Boudreaux (see text at note 2, supra), which held
that the search for and production of oil and gas in navigable waters of the United
States is a maritime activity, Sohyde, even if upheld, will be limited to torts and con-
1982l
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on the fixed offshore platform is within the jurisdiction of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act.17 As there is no federal law applicable
to the contract,18 Louisiana law as adoptive federal law will control.19
The recent passage of Act 427 by the Louisiana Legislature" has
created an exception to the general Louisiana principles interpreting
indemnity provisions when the agreement is contained in a contract
pertaining to the energy industry. This legislation is applicable to the
second hypothetical contract. The third contract, although governed
by Louisiana law, is unaffected by the new legislation, as a contract
to perform welding services in an automobile tire factory is unrelated
to the exploration for, production of, or refinement of energy
resources.2 ' Thus, although both the second and third contracts are
controlled by Louisiana law, different rules apply to each.
During the performance of each contract, one of the contractor's
employees is injured due to the negligence of the owner-indemnitee.
The owner cannot expect a favorable result in all three cases when
he claims his alleged right to indemnity from the welder-indemnitor.
Although the three indemnity provisions are identical in language and
intent, different legal principles control each underlying contract.
Therefore, an understanding of these legal principles and the kinds
of contracts to which they apply is essential to a resolution of the
issues.
tracts arising out of the performance of certain services in the territorial waters of
Louisiana. Also, Sohyde made the dubious distinction that the case was one involving
property damage, rather than personal injury.
17. "It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the outer Continen-
tal Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control,
and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter." 43 U.S.C. S 1332(a) (Supp. 1981).
18. Fixed offshore platforms are islands, not vessels, and therefore maritime law
is not applicable to transactions concerning these platforms. See Rodrigue v. Aetna,
395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
19. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act S 203(a), 43 U.S.C. S 1333(2)(A) (Supp. 1981)
provides:
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter
or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now or hereafter
adopted, the civil and criminal law of each adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter
adopted, amended, or repealed, are declared to be the law of the United States,
for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and
artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the
area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the margin of the
outer Continental Shelf . . ..
20. 1981 La. Acts, No. 427, adding LA. R.S. 9:2780.
21. LA. R.S. 9:2780 (Supp. 1981) prohibits only indemnity agreements in contracts
relating to the "exploration for, production of, or refinement of energy resources."
[Vol. 43
NOTES
Classification of Contracts
The classification of a contract as maritime or nonmaritime is
essential to an assessment of the scope and validity of any indemnity
agreement contained therein. Admiralty jurisdiction over a contract
depends upon the existence of maritime flavor in its subject matter.2 1
Admiralty jurisdiction cannot exist when the subject matter of the
contract is not a maritime object.
Admiralty jurisdiction usually will attach when there is a signifi-
cant relationship between the contract and a vessel, 23 a term which
Congress has defined broadly.24 In 1903, the Supreme Court held in
The Robert W. Parsons25 that "neither size, form, equipment nor means
of propulsion are determinative factors upon the question of jurisdic-
tion, which regards only the purpose for which the craft was con-
structed and the business in which it is engaged."26 Therefore, accor-
ding to both Congress and the Supreme Court, the question of whether
22. Admiralty jurisdiction in tort, however, is determined by locality plus a signifi-
cant connection with traditional maritime activity. See, e.g., Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d
520 (5th Cir. 1973). Because the obligation arising from an indemnity agreement is
contractual, it is not important whether the actual tort indemnified against is maritime
or state. If the contract is maritime and the injury occurs during the performance
of the contract, it does not matter that the tort may have occurred on land.
Although the right to tort indemnity and the right to contractual indemnity arise
from different legal theories, the concepts have sometimes been confused. In Reed
v. Pool Offshore Co., 521 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. La. 1981), two service companies con-
tracted separately to perform services on a barge. The barge owner was the indem-
nitee in identical indemnity provisions contained in each contract. When the plaintiff
was injured during the performance of the services, the plaintiff was found 5/0
negligent, the barge owner 60% negligent, service company A 20% negligent, and
service company B 15/o negligent. After A and B had paid their respective tort debts,
the issue centered on how the 60% liability of the barge owner should be divided
between the two indemnitors, A and B. The court held that each should pay in pro-
portion to his fault: A paid 20/35 and B paid 15/35 of the amount owed by the barge
owner. However, the amount of the indemnitors' tort liability should have been irrele-
vant on the issue of their contractual liability. A and B had each bound themselves
for the same thing and thus were solidarily liable. As between themselves, each owed
one-half of the debt.
23. This relationship must be substantial. "The mere fact that the services to
be performed under a contract relate to a ship or its business or that a ship is the
object of such services, does not, in and of itself, mean they are maritime." Marchessini
& Co. v. Pacific Marine Corp., 227 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
24. "The word 'vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water."
1 U.S.C. S 3 (1977).
25. 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
26. Id. at 19.
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an object is a vessel is determined by its capacity to be used in naviga-
tion as well as its actual use.
The test of both original purpose and present use was met in Dar-
dar v. Louisiana,27 where a ferry which traveled along a cable was
classified as a vessel. It actually floated on water and was intended
and used to transport people and automobiles over water.' Both fac-
tors, however, need not always be present. In Kenny v. New York,29
admiralty jurisdiction was extended to a suit for damage to a deck
scow. The scow was capable of navigation but was being used only
in displaying fireworks. The fact that the scow was originally con-
structed for navigation outweighed the significance of its present use.'
Moveable submersible drilling platforms, unlike permanently fix-
ed drilling platforms, are vessels.31 A moveable drilling platform is
subject to the perils of the sea, making it an appropriate object for
maritime jurisdiction. A fixed drilling platform, although also subject
to the perils of the sea, is considered an artificial island rather than
a vessel.2 A submersible oil storage facility used in connection with
offshore drilling was classified as a "vessel" in Hicks v. Ocean Drill-
ing and Exploration Co.3" The facility had no motive power in itself,
but the court looked to the purpose for which it was constructed and
the business in which it was engaged. Floating drydocks35 generally
are not vessels subject to admiralty jurisdiction,' as they are not sub-
ject to the perils of the sea. When, however, they are treated and
27. 322 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. La. 1971).
28. The court cited 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY S 53, at 111 (1940): "all are ships
and vessels that are manned by a master and crew and are devoted to the purposes
of transportation and commerce."
29. 108 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1940).
30. Cf., Ross v. Moak, 388 F. Supp. 461 (M.D. La. 1975) (Admiralty jurisdiction
denied where barges originally constructed for navigation were being used as a per-
manently fixed store with shore-based water and electric connections; the permanent
nature of their present use outweighed the factor of original purpose of construction).
31. Wilkerson v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
32. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
33. 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. Cf., Cook v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1973) (Floating
construction platform secured by ropes to dock was legally indistinguishable from a
floating drydock and was not a vessel; the platform was neither intended nor used
for traditional maritime activities).
35. A floating drydock is a large dock in the form of a basin, from which water
can be emptied. It is used for maintaining, repairing, and altering a ship below the
water line. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 401 (5th ed. 1975).
36. J.M.L. Trading Corp. v. Marine Salvage Corp., 501 F. Supp. 323, 324 (E.D.N.Y.
1980).
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used as vessels, they may fall within admiralty jurisdiction. 7
When a vessel is permanently withdrawn from navigation, it can
no longer be the object of admiralty jurisdiction. 8 When, however,
the withdrawal from navigation has been only temporary, such as for
repairs, a contract for services to the vessel while not in navigation
is still within the admiralty jurisdiction. In this regard, courts look
to the purpose and business of the vessel before its withdrawal and
the use for which it is intended once repairs are completed. 9
The line dividing maritime matters from nonmaritime matters is
sometimes shakily and unconvincingly drawn. For example, the
jurisprudence consistently has denied maritime status to contracts for
the building or sale of a ship,"' yet repeatedly has held that contracts
for the repair of vessels are within maritime jurisdiction.4 Preliminary
services relating to vessels are not the subject of maritime contracts.
Such services include contracts to procure labor,' charter,'3 and marine
insurance." Yet, disputes over completed contracts for insurance, labor,
and charters are welcomed in the federal admiralty courts.'5
The tenuous distinction between contracts that fall on either side
of the judicially-drawn line is the degree of involvement with maritime
37. Id. at 325.
38. Kilb v. Merke, 121 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1941).
39. L g., id. (large houseboat without motive power and without rudder and a
steam yacht which towed the houseboat had been tied up for almost four years; they
were held to be within admiralty jurisdiction because they had been engaged in naviga-
tion before they were tied up, they were not dismantled or put to any other use,
and the vessels had recently been purchased with the intention of navigating them).
Cf., Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. La. 1973) (Admiralty
jurisdiction denied to a contractor who had been hired to paint a former steamship
which no longer had shafts, wheels, rudders, engines, or boilers; the contract was merely
to paint the former vessel, not to put it back into commission.).
40. The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819); The Ada, 250 F. 194 (2d
Cir. 1918).
41. The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438; Severn v. U.S., 69 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
42. Gonzales v. Penn R.R. Co., 183 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
43. The Thames, 10 F. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1881).
44. Warner v. The Bear, 126 F. Supp. 529 (D. Alaska 1955).
45. See also P.D. Marchessini & Co. v. Pacific Marine Corp., 227 F. Supp. 17
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (general agent who furnishes shore-side services to the vessel but takes
no part in the actual operation or management of the vessel may not sue in admiral-
ty); Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1961); Economu v. Bates, 222
F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (when the general agent must actually supervise as well
as procure services and supplies, he is an active participant in the operation and manage-
ment of the vessel and his contract is in admiralty).
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activities and risks. A conflict exists between the need for uniformity
of law governing the shipping industry and the interest of the in-
dividual states in regulating the activities of their citizens. The con-
stitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts" was
a response to the need for consistency in the fluid world of maritime
commerce. But when vessel-related activities are centered in one place,
such as the preliminary activities of agents and the repair work on
vessels permanently removed from navigation, the contract becomes
more amenable to local control. In such cases, the balance tips towards
the interest of the state in governing its citizens' transactions.
Some contracts are governed by state law despite the fact that
they affect maritime commerce and transportation. If there is no
strong federal interest in resolving a particular issue and the state
has a strong interest in that area, the contract is characterized as
"maritime but local."'7 Although federal courts have the power to
create federal admiralty common law, they decline to do so in such
cases.
Agreements to perform both maritime and nonmaritime services
may be included in a single contract.48 Such a contract, often referred
to as a "mixed contract, " 49 may contain an indemnity agreement designed
to cover the performance of both maritime and nonmaritime services.
Some courts have held that if the maritime duties in a contract are
capable of being severed from the nonmaritime obligations so that
they might be separately adjudicated, the contract is separable and
the nonmaritime obligation will not come under admiralty jurisdiction.5'
Thus, if an injury occurs in the performance of the nonmaritime obliga-
tion, the indemnity agreement will be interpreted according to state
law. Other courts, however, have held that where the dominant com-
ponent of the contract is the maritime obligation, the admiralty court
may take jurisdiction over the whole contract and determine the non-
maritime matter.51 Under this approach, the indemnity agreement will
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to ... all
cases of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction .... "
47. Grant-Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). See Davis v. Department of Labor and Inds. of
Washington, 317 U.S. 249 (1942). Gilmore and Black contend that Davis abolishes
"maritime but local." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 420 (2d ed. 1975).
48. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. City of New York, 135 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1943).
49. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK supra note 47, at 28.
50. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Farrel Line, 81 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
51. Gronvold v. Suryan, 12 F. Supp. 429 (W.D. Wash. 1935); United Fruit Co. v.
United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corp., 42 F.2d 222 (D. Mass. 1930).
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be interpreted according to maritime principles, even though the in-
jury occurs in the performance of the nonmaritime obligation.
A contract can be properly classified and the controlling law deter-
mined through consideration of the above factors.2 An indemnity
agreement then may be assessed within the context of the law which
applies to the underlying contract. The scope of the distinction in treat-
ment of maritime indemnity agreements and nonmaritime indemnity
agreements becomes apparent as specific contractual indemnity pro-
visions are analyzed according to the applicable law.
Indemnity Agreements in Maritime Contracts
Admiralty courts recognize that parties of relatively equal bargain-
ing power should be allowed to negotiate the economic aspects of their
contracts. Contractors and vessel owners are in a better position than
the courts to balance their losses. Generally, the courts have upheld
agreements in which an indemnitor promises to hold harmless the in-
demnitee against the indemnitee's own negligence.53 However, unless
the language of the provision clearly and unequivocally indicates the
intention to indemnify against the indemnitee's fault, the courts
presume that a party does not intend to hold harmless one who was
himself at fault. This presumption is not irrebuttable.
In Roberts v. Williams-McWilliams,4 the presumption was over-
come. The contract provided that a repair service company working
on the employer's barge would indemnify the barge owner for any
injury "resulting from or in any way connected with the services per-
formed, even though contributed to or in any way connected with
joint or concurrent fault or negligence on the part of ... [the owner]."'
The jury found that the indemnitor's actions were a contributing cause
but neither a joint nor a concurrent proximate cause of the injury
and that the owner-indemnitee's actions were the proximate cause of
the injury. The court held that the vessel owner was entitled to in-
demnification. The language clearly evinced an intent that indemnifica-
52. Other considerations can be helpful in classifying a contract. For example,
if a contract has traditionally been regarded as maritime under the general maritime
common law of nations, the parties to a present contract of that nature should be
able to rely upon their reasonable expectations that the agreement would be controlled
by maritime law.
53. Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1975); Jurisich
v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 349 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. La.: 1972).
54. 648 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 264.
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tion would be provided when the vessel owner was also at fault and
did not specify that the indemnitor must have been a proximate or
joint cause of the injury. Although the owner's sole negligence would
have precluded indemnification, the court held that the contributing
though not proximate negligence of the contractor was sufficient to
render him liable under the terms of the contract.
A few exceptions have been carved out of the general rule that
one may bargain away liability based upon his own strict liability or
negligent acts. Under these narrowly drawn exceptions, principles of
interpretation are irrelevant and the indemnity provisions are declared
void as a matter of public policy.
In Bisso v. Inland Waterways,56 the Supreme Court held that all
contracts releasing towers from liability for their negligent towing
of a barge are void, as against public policy. The court noted that
as there was no controlling statute, the issue would be resolved as
part of the judicially-created admiralty law. The rule was established
to discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay damages and to
protect those in need of goods or services from being overreached
by their more powerful counterparts. The court determined that the
towing contract was made by parties with unequal bargaining powers;
the barge owner, requiring the service of towage, had to accept the
indemnity provisions.
Four years after Bisso, the Supreme Court, in S.W. Sugar &
Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp.," refused to hold void an ex-
culpatory provision in a public carrier's tariff. The court deferred to
the Interstate Commerce Commission for a determination of the
economic needs of the tugboat industry, holding that the rule of Bisso
involved a private contract of towage and did not extend to common
carriers regulated by the ICC. 8 Although the court emphasized that
the ICC had the ability, through regulation, to protect those in need
of services from being overreached by more powerful parties, it con-
cluded that the rationale of Bisso was not intended to be reduced
to this economic consideration.
The policy of discouraging negligence by making wrongdoers pay
has remained a consideration in subsequent cases. 9 S.W. Sugar has
56. 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
57. 360 U.S. 411 (1959).
58. "The rule of Bisso, however applicable where the towboat owner has the 'power
to drive hard bargains,' may well call for modification when that power is effectively
controlled by a pervasive regulatory scheme." Id. at 418.
59. Hart v. Blakemore, 410 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1969); Dixilyn v. Crescent Towing
Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963); American S.S. Co. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 333 F.2d 426
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been distinguished as an instance in which the court "merely preferred
to give the ICC an opportunity to rule on an exculpatory clause
which was part of a tariff filed with the commission."6
The holding of Bisso has been limited carefully to the unique fac-
tual situation where the tows lack power and crews and have no right
of participation in the control of the venture."1 The policy of allowing
indemnification against one's own negligence where the intention of
the parties is clear has been overturned only in the narrowly drawn
circumstance where there is sole negligence by one party who con-
tracted to provide a necessary service to another who had no control
over the performance of the work. This judicially-created admiralty
principle has not been extended to other express contractual
relationships.62
Bisso was invoked in Hicks v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.63
by a supplier of labor to a fixed offshore platform, who claimed that
an indemnity agreement was invalid as against public policy. The par-
ties did not bargain or discuss any of the contract terms, and the
supplier had no opportunity to reject the indemnity provisions without
rejecting the entire work contract. The court held that Bisso was in-
applicable on the basis that a contract for labor on a drilling platform
is not a maritime contract and is governed by Louisiana law as federal
law through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 4 In dictum,
however, the court stated that even if Bisso had been applicable, the
supplier was an experienced company of substantial size and had equal
bargaining power with the fixed platform owner. The court's assess-
ment of the parties is unconvincing, as such indemnity agreements
are standard in the industry and are thrust upon contractors by the
more powerful platform owners. Arguably, the supplier would have
to accept the terms of the contract as offered or he would lose the
opportunity to one of the many other suppliers in the field.
In addition to its inaccurate assessment of the parties, the court
overlooked the second rationale of Bisso: discouraging negligence by
making wrongdoers pay. The court's focus was solely on the existence
(7th Cir. 1964); American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Roem Steams, Co., 216 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D. Wisc. 1963).
60. Dixilyn v. Crescent Towing Co., 372 U.S. at 698.
61. 349 U.S. at 95.
62. E.g., Dickerson v. Continental Oil, 449 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1971) (Bisso held
not applicable to indemnity agreement between fixed offshore platform owner and
contractor).
63. 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975).
64. 43 U.S.C. S 1333(2)(A).
65. 349 U.S. at 91.
19821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of bargaining power between the parties. The court's dictum illustrates
the tendency of the admiralty courts to uphold express indemnity
agreements except in the narrow exception outlined in Bisso.
The Maritime Warranty of Workmanlike Performance
Indemnity provisions in a contract to perform services of a
maritime nature are not always express. The obligation to perform
work in a competent and safe manner is the essence of the maritime
service company's contract"6 and implies an indemnity for the breach
of this "warranty of workmanlike performance." 7 The indemnity im-
plicit in the warranty of workmanlike performance was developed in
response to the decision of Sea Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,6 in which
the court held that a longshoreman doing the traditional work of a
seaman had a right against the vessel on which he was working for
damages he incurred as a result of the vessel's unseaworthiness 6 ' To
ameliorate the harsh effect on a vessel when liability was based upon
negligent harm to a longshoreman, the court later held, in Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Co.,"° that a ship has a right
to indemnity from a stevedore who has breached his warranty of
workmanlike performance. This right of indemnification was not found-
ed upon tort or any duty owed by the employer-stevedore to his in-
jured employee, but was founded upon a breach of the purely con-
tractual implied obligation to perform the contract in a reasonably
safe manner.7'
An indemnity claim under Ryan can be reduced or defeated by
vessel, negligence. In Gator Marine Service Towing v. J. Ray
McDermott, 2 the jury determined that under maritime comparative
fault principles the stevedore was sixty percent liable and the vessel
owner was forty percent liable for the damages which occurred when
an improperly loaded ship capsized. The vessel owner claimed that
the stevedore should bear the entire loss because it breached its war-
ranty of workmanlike performance. The court, however, cast the
stevedore for only sixty percent of the damages. Thus, the warranty
is an indemnification against the negligence of the stevedore and not
66. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
67. Id. at 130.
68. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
69. A vessel which is "unseaworthy" is one which is unable to withstand the perils
of an ordinary voyage at sea. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Compania de Navegacion,
19 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1927).
70. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
71. Id. at 131.
72. 651 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1981).
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against the vessel owner's own negligence.73 Hence, when both par-
ties are negligent, damages are apportioned between the two."
The longshoreman's right to an action for unseaworthiness was
legislatively overruled by the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).5 Under S 905(b)
of the amended act, the shipowner now may be held liable only for
negligence chargeable to the vessel" and not for negligence of the
stevedore. The vessel owner's right to indemnity from an employer
covered by the LHWCA was also overruled. 7' Thus, as between vessels
and employers covered by the act, the Ryan doctrine no longer may
be invoked. However, there still may be a right of indemnification
from the employer based upon the warranty of workmanlike perfor-
mance owed by the service company to a third party. For example,
a worker not covered by the LHWCA may sue a vessel for injuries
incurred while working on the vessel, and in such an instance the
vessel could seek indemnity from the employer. Another possibility
is that a third party (i.e., not the employee) which is not a vessel
may seek indemnity based upon the warranty of workmanlike
performance.
In Stevens v. East-West Towing Co., 5 the plaintiff was a deckhand
who had been employed to move a barge. Stevens tied the bowline
onto a stop plate of the barge, which snapped off as the barge moved
away from the tug. He was injured when the stop plate struck him
in the head. The bareboat charterer of the barge claimed that the
73. For a vessel owner to be negligent, he must have either actual or construc-
tive knowledge. "[A] vessel is not liable for injuries resulting from known or obvious
dangers unless the shipowner should anticipate the harm despite the obviousness of
the danger." Evans v. Transportation Maritime Mexicana, 639 F.2d 848, 855 (2d Cir.
1981).
74. 651 F.2d at 1099; Agrico Chep. Co. v. M/V Ben W. Martin, 664 F.2d 85 (5th
Cir. 1981).
75. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972
S 943(a), 33 U.S.C. S 905(b) (1978) (emphasis added) provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such persons, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third
party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title .... The liability
of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seawor-
thiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred . .
76. See text at note 73, supra.
77. "[Tlhe employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly
or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void." 33
U.S.C. S 905(b).
78. 649 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1981).
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plaintiff was negligent in tying the bow line to the stop plate; the
plaintiff argued that the bitts and cleats on the river side of the barge
were missing and there was no place to tie the barge. The Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the charterer was neither negligent nor was his vessel
unseaworthy, as blue-prints and photographs indicated that bitts and
cleats were present. The court stated in dictum, however, that even
had the bareboat charterer been negligent or his vessel unseawor-
thy, East-West, as the employer of the seaman plaintiff, had breached
its warranty of workmanlike performance and the vessel was entitled
to indemnity. Thus, the Fifth Circuit will uphold the existence of the
Ryan doctrine where the injured employee is not covered by the
LHWCA.
When the third party who is owed the warranty of workmanlike
performance by the service company is not a vessel, § 905(a) rather
than S 905(b) of the LHWCA is applicable. The liability of an employer
covered by the Act is exclusive of all other liability for damages "on
account of such injury or death." 7 9 In Pippen v. Shell Oil Co.,80 the
Fifth Circuit held that one who was the lessee and charterer of a
vessel, and not the owner of the vessel, was not precluded from en-
forcing an express or implied contractual indemnity agreement against
the employer. The rationale was that § 905(b) cut off indemnity only
to a "vessel," which the court defined as "vessel-owner,"81 and therefore
§ 905(a) was the applicable provision. The exclusivity provision of
905(a) is extended only to suits "on account of'82 the contract, whether
it be express or implied. Although in this case no express or implied
contractual indemnity was found,83 the decision acknowledged the
possibility that a LHWCA employer could become contractually liable
for indemnification of a non-vessel under § 905(a).
79. 33 U.S.C. S 905(a) provides:
The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be ex-
clusive and in place of all other liability to the employee, . . .and anyone else
entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on ac-
count of such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment
or compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or his legal
representative in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compen-
sation under this chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for
damages on account of such injury or death. ...
80. 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 385. By refusing to consider 905(b) applicable to Shell, the lessee, and
the charterer, the court appeared to limit the meaning of "vessel" to "vessel-owner."
This limitation is inconsistent with S 902(21) of the LHWCA, which defines "vessel"
to include "agent, operator, charter or bare boat charterer."
82. 33 U.S.C. S 905(a).
83. 661 F.2d at 388.
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Pippen further illustrates the maritime policy of upholding indem-
nity agreements except where expressly prohibited by statute, as in
905(b), or by court-created admiralty law, as in Bisso. A narrow in-
terpretation of these exceptions is appropriate only as long as the
policies behind the limitations are not ignored. The prohibition of the
employer's indemnification liability to the vessel was a quid pro quo
for the elimination of the warranty of seaworthiness owed by the
vessel to the Sieracki seaman and the consequent limitation of the
vessel's liability to negligence only.84 No such quid pro quo was of-
fered to non-vessels. When, however, a charterer is considered a "non-
vessel," even though it has assumed the responsibilities and liabilities
of the owner and is benefitted by the elimination of the warranty
of seaworthiness to longshoremen, the intention of §905(b) is circum-
vented.85
The Ninth Circuit, in Price v. Zim-Israel Navigation Co.,86 narrowly
interpreted § 905(b) to uphold an indemnity agreement which provid-
ed that the stevedoring concern would have the vessel named as coin-
sured under its liability policy. The court held that the § 905(b) pro-
hibition was inapplicable because the shipowner's suit was against the
insurer, not against the stevedore. The 1972 amendments were in-
tended merely to eliminate third party litigation between the vessel
and stevedore so that financial resources, which previously were be-
ing spent on litigation, could be better utilized to pay improved com-
pensation benefits. Although the court noted that there was no addi-
tional charge for the coinsured endorsement at the time the contract
was executed, it reasoned that the economic burden of premiums could
be allocated as the parties wished. This reasoning indicates that even
had there been a charg6 by the insurance company for the endorse-
ment, the courts would have allowed the vessel and stevedore to
bargain as to that cost. The decision ignores the problem of unequal
bargaining power between the vessel and the stevedore, which
realistically has no opportunity to reject the economic burden of the
premium if it desires to receive the contract. The Price court cir-
cumvented one of the major purposes of the amendments to § 905(b),
which was to prevent the more powerful vessel owner from requir-
ing the stevedore to assume indemnity for the vessel's negligence. 7
84. Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981).
85. See text at note 80, supra.
86. 616 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1980).
87. Under the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress intended to cut off
circuitous indemnity litigation and to make compensation benefits the exclusive liability
of the employer. Steamship Seatrain Louisiana ex ret Tyler Tanker Corp. v. California
Stevedore and Ballast Co., 424 F Supp. 180 (D.C. Cal. 1976).
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The contractor's burden of having the vessel named as coinsured is
functionally no different than the requirement that the contractor in-
demnify the vessel."8
The zone of responsibility undertaken by a contractor in a con-
tract containing a warranty of workmanlike performance may extend
beyond the parties to the contract. However, it cannot be divorced
from the policy behind this warranty that protects the shipowner's
right of indemnity. There is a strong argument, then, that when the
ship is not subject to the strict liability of unseaworthiness, indem-
nification based .upon the implied warranty should not be invoked.8"
The Second Circuit recognized the limited scope of the implied
warranty of workmanlike performance in holding that in the absence
of the vessel's exposure to liability regardless of fault, there was no
basis for indemnity which disregarded the vessel's own fault." No in-
demnification against the vessel's own negligence was allowed. Hence
the warranty can be invoked only when a shipowner, relying on the
expertise of the contractor, enters into a contract whereby the con-
tractor agrees to perform services without the supervision or control
of the shipowner.
Under certain circumstances, a worker may owe indemnity to a
co-worker, even when the co-worker has been jointly negligent. In
Hartett v. Reiss Steamship Co.,9 decided prior to the 1972 amend-
ments to the LHWCA, the supplier of a grain elevator and other
machinery used to unload a vessel claimed to be the third party
beneficiary of the unloading workers' warranty of workmanlike per-
formance owed to the vessel. The court held that the grain elevator
owner had substantial control over the operation and, therefore, was
not owed indemnity by the other stevedoring concern. However, in
dictum, the court stated that where all the control is in one stevedore,
he may owe indemnity to a co-stevedore as a third party beneficiary
of the warranty between the stevedore and the vessel.
A manufacturer sought to recover from the stevedore with whom
it had been found jointly liable in Zapico v. Bucyrus-Arie Co."2 The
manufacturer contended that it was a third party beneficiary of an
88. See text at note 143, infra.
89. The implied warranty of workmanlike performance does not extend beyond
the shipowner-stevedore originated rule to cover the relationships of contractors with
the owners of fixed offshore drilling platforms. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v.
Berry Brothers, 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1967).
90. Navieros Oceanikos v. S.T. Mobil Trader, 554 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1977).
91. 421 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1970).
92. 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978).
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implied warranty of workmanlike performance owed by the stevedore
to the vessel. The court stated that the Ryan indemnity was not cut
off as to non-vessels in all cases. Nevertheless, the court held that
the third party plaintiff would have to be engaged in a close working
relationship with the stevedore to be entitled to the implied warran-
ty and, therefore, denied the remote manufacturer's assertion.
Concluding Remarks on Contractual Maritime Indemnity
The above cases illustrate that although the presumption is against
the intention to indemnify against the indemnitee's own fault, maritime
principles generally do not prohibit, as a matter of public policy, in-
demnity agreements in which the language is clear and unambiguous.
There are two exceptions, however, where no indemnification is
allowed. First, under Bisso, a tower may not contract against its own
negligence in the towing of a barge whose owners have no control
over the operation. 3 Second, a vessel may not seek indemnity from
the employers of injured workers covered by the LHWCA when the
employee brings a S 905(b) action for negligence against the vessel."'
These exceptions encompass the factual circumstances where an ine-
quality of bargaining power exists which renders the purported in-
demnitor incapable of protecting himself against such demands. The
indemnity agreements falling under these two exceptions are also pro-
hibited in an attempt to deter negligent behavior by making the ac-
tor responsible for his conduct.
Since the 1972 amendments, the courts have upheld all forms of
indemnity agreements, express and implied, that have fallen outside
the specific prohibition in S 905(b) of the LHWCA.9 5 Where the third
party is a non-vessel or the plaintiff is not covered by the act, both
express and implied contractual indemnity are allowed. The general
disposition of the courts to allow indemnification against one's own
negligence in maritime contracts remains. This tendency is illustrated
by a Ninth Circuit case which allowed a vessel to receive indemnifica-
tion from a stevedore's insurance company after the vessel had re-
quired that the stevedore name the vessel as a coinsured in the
policy." Such a reading of S 905(b) is overly restrictive in that it
defeats the policy of protecting the less powerful stevedore. Although
the exceptions to the general maritime principle of allowing indem-
nification should be interpreted narrowly, the courts should consider
93. See text at note 56, supra.
94. See text at notes 75-76, supra.
95. E.g., Pippen v. Shell, 661 F.2d 378; Price v. Zim-Israel, 616 F.2d 422.
96. Price v. Zim-Israel, 616 F.2d 422.
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whether allowing indemnity in a particular case would infringe upon
the policies behind the exceptions.
Indemnity Agreements Under Louisiana Law
Louisiana law will govern contracts made within Louisiana or its
territorial waters which do not concern traditional maritime activities.
Even when the contract is concededly maritime, it may be governed
by Louisiana law if the subject matter is of little interest to the ad-
miralty courts in their efforts to achieve a uniform body of law in
maritime transactions.97 Contracts for the performance of services on
fixed offshore platforms are also controlled by Louisiana law.9"
Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Louisiana law is
applied as adoptive federal law when there is no applicable federal
law to govern the action." Fixed platforms beyond three miles from
the shores of Louisiana are considered federal enclaves or islands and
are not classified as vessels.' Therefore, Louisiana law applies to con-
tracts made for the performance of the many services essential to
exploration for and capture of energy resources on these platforms.
These contracts are made between offshore platform owners and
welders, drillers, casing crews, suppliers, caterers, and others; these
contracts presumably involve none of the traditional hazards associated
with vessels. The platforms are not subject to the traditional perils
of the sea, and the men working on these islands are closely tied to
the adjacent state to which they commute and in which their families
live.0  The needs and problems of these relatively permanently based
workers are more easily handled by local state law. Hence they do
not require the more general admiralty law applicable to transitory
seamen.
This reasoning, however, is not persuasive when the issue is the
enforceability of an indemnity agreement between a Louisiana based
contractor and the owner of a fixed platform. The welder in our
hypothetical situation' had a contract with a vessel owner and a con-
tract with that same person as a fixed platform owner. A difference
in the treatment of the two indemnity agreements, based on the
classification of the work locale as either vessel or non-vessel, has
97. See text at note 47, supra.
98. See text at notes 17-18, supra.
99. See text at note 19, supra.
100. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
101. Id. It should be noted that jack-up rigs are also not subject to the perils of
the sea, except while being moved from one place to another. Jack-up rigs, however,
are classified by the courts as vessels. See text at note 31, supra.
102. See text at note 15, supra.
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no reasonable foundation. However, because indemnity provisions are
controlled by the law which governs the underlying contract, the in-
demnity provisions contained in contracts for services on fixed plat-
forms are interpreted according to Louisiana law.
In Louisiana, an indemnity contract will not be construed to in-
demnify the indemnitee against losses he suffers through his own
negligent acts unless such intention is expressed in unequivocal
language. This rule of interpretation consistently has been reaffirmed
in the Louisiana courts and has been extended to situations in-
volving concurrent negligence on the part of the indemnitee and
indemnitor."'0 What that "unequivocal language" must be, however,
was not defined until the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cole v. Chevron."4
Cole, a welder employed by a contractor to do work for Chevron's
Louisiana plant, was injured when he slipped in oil on the plant floor.
Chevron sought indemnity against the plaintiffs employer under a
written indemnity agreement between the parties. The contract pro-
vided for indemnification for injuries caused "directly or indirectly"
by the performance of the contract obligation. The trial court found
that Chevron and the employer were concurrently negligent in con-
tributing to the presence of the oil on the floor. The Fifth Circuit
held that under Louisiana law, indemnity is not owed when the in-
demnitee is wholly or partially at fault unless the agreement expressly
requires indemnification for accidents arising from the indemnitee's
negligence. The indemnity agreement must contain "talismanic" words,
such as "even though caused by the negligence of indemnitee.""l' If
a word such as "negligence" is not present, the presumption arises
that the indemnification is applicable only to the vicarious responsibili-
ty of the indemnitee for the indemnitor's negligent acts."'6 The provi-
sion providing for indemnification for injuries caused "directly or in-
directly" was not sufficiently express to allow Chevron to receive in-
demnity from the welding contractor.
The Fifth Circuit applied Louisiana law as adoptive federal law
in Aymond v. Texaco,"7 in which a member of an oil drilling crew on
a fixed platform beyond three miles off the coast of Louisiana brought
an action for personal injury. The court, referring to Cole as authori-
ty, held that the indemnitee failed to bear its heavy burden of proof
that indemnification would be provided even for its own negligence.
103. Strickland v. Nutt, 264 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
104. 477 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1973).
105. Id. at 368.
106. Id.
107. 554 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The court reasoned that "[flailure to expressly use the word negligence
is evidence of the .. . intention not to provide indemnification for
the indemnitee's negligent acts.""1 8 The pertinent language of the con-
tract stated: "Contractor also agrees to protect, indemnify and save
TEXACO harmless of and from all claims, demands, and causes of
action in favor of Contractor's employees . .. no matter how such claim
arises."' 9 Because of the failure to use "negligence," the parties
were presumed only to have intended to cover those situations in
which a party other than Texaco or the contractor successfully held
Texaco vicariously liable for the contractor's negligence. Here, Tex-
aco itself was found negligent and the court did not allow
indemnification.'10
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has not required the
presence of specific words. The real question, according to the Loui-
siana court in Polozola v. Garlock,"' is the intention of the parties,
and the intention to indemnify against the indemnitee's own fault can
be found even in the absence of talismanic language. The court held
that an indemnity agreement promising to indemnify "from and against
any and all claims and causes of actions" and "arising from any
sources, ' ' 12 was sufficiently broad to cover injuries arising from the
indemnitee's own negligence. The court stated that the parties should
know how to write and could have written a contract specifically ex-
cluding coverage for injuries caused by the indemnitee's negligence
if they had wished.
The first circuit case does not stand alone. The Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal, in Deblieux v. P.S. & Sons Painting, Inc., '
relied on Polozola to find that the parties intended that the contrac-
tor indemnify even against the indemnitee's fault. The court held that
although the contract did not contain the words "even though caused
by the negligence of indemnitee," it should be interpreted to require
the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee against its own fault."'
In Battig v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,"' the parents of
a mentally retarded boy executed a release in an application to a
108. Id. at 209.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 210.
111. 334 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), affid on other grounds, 343 So. 2d 1000
(1977).
112. 334 So. 2d at 532.
113. 405 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 604.
115. 482 F. Supp. 338 ( V.D. La. 1977), aff d on other grounds, 608 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1979).
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boarding school which agreed to hold the school harmless for losses or
claims of any kind which might be made against it. The plaintiff-parent
relied on Cole, claiming that the release, to include liability for
negligent acts of the school, must specifically refer to negligent acts.
The defendant-school relied on Polozola, arguing that the clause need
not be so specific, as long as the intent of the parties was clear. The
federal court in this diversity case held that Polozola was the best
statement of Louisiana law and the language of the release was broad
enough to determine the intention of the parties to release the school
from even its own negligent acts. Specific reference to negligent acts
in order for an indemnity agreement or a release to cover claims based
on the indemnitee's negligent acts is not required.
The determination that there is an intention to indemnify against
the indemnitee's negligence does not mean that there is no limit upon
the resulting responsibility of the indemnitor. In Mott v. Ocean Dril-
ling & Exploration Co.,'" a subcontractor agreed to indemnify the con-
tractor for any and all claims arising out of the performance of the
contract, including those caused by the contractor's negligence or by
the unseaworthiness of the contractor's vessel."7 The welder-plaintiff
was injured when he fell from a defective ladder joining the two levels
of an offshore oil production platform. The defect in the ladder ex-
isted prior to the contract between the contractor and subcontractor.
The Fifth Circuit held that the indemnity agreement did not extend
to negligence caused by the indemnitee with respect to defects which
existed prior to the execution of the contract, as the phrase "any and
all claims" was qualified by the requirement that the claims be "inci-
dent to, arising out of, or in connection with or resulting from the
activities of the Subcontractor."'1
The Fifth Circuit reiterated, in Stephens v. Chevron,"' that under
Louisiana law an intention to indemnify an employer for his own
negligence will not be presumed in the absence of a clear and specific
contractual stipulation to that effect. Stephens, an offshore worker,
was injured when he disembarked from Chevron's boat and slipped
on the wharf which he alleged was slick with oil. The trial court held
that Chevron was not negligent and denied the plaintiffs claim. The
contract with the plaintiffs employer provided indemnification for
claims "in any way arising out of or connected with the performance
116. 577 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1978).
117. Id. at 276.
118. Id.
119. 517 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1975).
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of the Contractor of services hereunder.""12 Chevron claimed, and the
Fifth Circuit agreed, that in the total absence of its negligence the
intention of the parties was that the contractor would defend and in-
demnify against any work-connected claims.
A conflict exists for the service company bound by an indemnity
agreement such as that in Stephens. If the company wins in court,
by proving that the indemnitee was not negligent, it actually loses,
for it now must indemnify the indemnitee under the contract for the
defense of the claim. If the indemnitee is found negligent, the service
company loses in its defense of the indemnitee but will not be obligated
to indemnify. Presumably, the service company will be reimbursed
for the expenses of the defense it provided. A conflict of interest ex-
ists between the advantage to the service company of having the in-
demnitee found negligent and the contractual obligation to give the
indemnitee a good faith defense. The Fifth Circuit, in Stephens,
recognized this potential problem but left it unanswered by stating
that it would be handled better contractually by the parties, rather
than by the courts.
The parties could avoid this potential conflict by providing that
the indemnitee, rather than the indemnitor, choose the attorney who
will defend the case. In this way, the indemnitee can protect its in-
terest in proving it was not negligent. In many instances, however,
the parties will not provide contractually for this arrangement. An
argument can be made that an implied provision of the indemnity
agreement is that there be a good faith defense in which the primary
interest is proving that the indemnitee was not at fault. A breach
of this obligation could be treated as a breach of contract claim. Lack
of good faith, however, can be difficult to prove. If a subsequent case
arises in which the indemnitee claims that the indemnitor intentionally
avoided its burden of indemnification by not diligently defending the
indemnitee, the court will have to confront the problem of what should
be done when the parties have not resolved the problem contractually.
There is some Louisiana codal and jurisprudential authority sup-
porting the existence of an implied warranty of workmanlike perfor-
mance in Louisiana contracts.12 At least one Louisiana court has held
that it is implicit in every contract that "the work of the builder be
performed in a good workmanlike manner, free from defects at-
120. Id. at 1124.
121. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1930, 2762, 2769; Rathe v. Maher, 184 So. 2d 256 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1966); Wolfe v. Levasseur-Hinson Constr. Co., 147 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962).
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tributable either to faulty material or poor workmanship."'" This war-
ranty, however, has been applied only to contracts where there has
been a defect in the object of the contract. It has not been extended
to situations where personal injury has resulted from the performance
of the contract, and there has been no shifting of loss from a negligent
indemnitee to the indemnitor.
In Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Brothers,2 ' the court
considered whether the Ryan doctrine'24 should be extended to an off-
shore platform owner's contract with a repair contractor. The court
was unwilling to extend Ryan's shipowner-stevedore rule to a plat-
form case, as it had evolved under special rules of the obligation of
the shipowner.'25 The right to indemnification based upon a warranty
of workmanlike performance is strictly contractual in nature and is
not based on tort theories of active-passive and primary-secondary
negligence. Ocean Drilling's claims for indemnification when employees
of the repair contractor were injured on a fixed offshore platform were
founded purely in tort principles and should not be viewed as involv-
ing a breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike performance.'2 6
There is a strong argument, however, that a circumstance similar
to the shipowner's liability to the stevedore for unseaworthiness prior
to 1972 has evolved on a fixed offshore platform and that the war-
ranty of workmanlike performance should be implied in such instances
to alleviate the harshness of the obligation placed upon the platform
owner. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2322,27 the owner of a
building is strictly liable for damages which occur through the ruin
of his building. Strict liability of the owner of a building for harm
caused by defects in its structure or appurtenances imposes a
nondelegable duty upon the owner to keep his building in repair and
to be responsible to third persons for harm caused by any defect.'
A fixed offshore platform has been held to be a "building" for pur-
poses of article 2322." Thus, in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 30 the platform
122. Rathe v. Maher, 184 So. 2d at 258.
123. 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1967).
124. See text at notes 70 & 71, supra.
125. 377 F.2d at 512.
126. Id. at 513.
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2322: "The owner of a building is answerable for the damage
occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the
result of a vice in its original construction."
128. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
129. Moczygemba v. Danos & Curole Marine Contractors, 561 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th
Cir. 1977).
130. 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1979).
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owner was held liable when, due to the negligence of a contractor,
the hot water heater exploded and caused the ruin of the building.
The court stated that the owner and contractor may regulate, as
between themselves, duties of indemnification, but could not limit
statutory liability to third persons for injuries arising from premise
defects. '31 Under recent Louisiana legislation,'32 however, parties such
as Olsen and Shell will not be able to contractually allocate indem-
nification. Thus, the fixed platform owner will be left with a duty
similar to the strict liability of providing a seaworthy vessel and will
be liable even for the ruin of his platform caused by the negligence
of a contractor with substantial control over the fixed platform. The
platform owner will be held liable to an injured third party, without
any hope of contractual indemnification from the contractor, unless
a warranty of workmanlike performance similar to the Ryan doctrine
is extended to article 2322 liability.1
3
Concluding Remarks on Louisiana Contractual Indemnity
Courts applying Louisiana law have upheld contractual indemni-
ty agreements when the language has been clear and unequivocal.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has required the "talismanic word"
"negligence" to overcome the presumption against the intention to
indemnify against the indemnitee's own negligence. Other courts have
not required this "talismanic word," looking instead to the intent of
the parties as evidenced by the contractual provision as written. The
Fifth Circuit approach is unnecessarily rigid and is inconsistent with
the Louisiana law that courts should ascertain the intent of the par-
ties when interpreting contracts.'" Although the legal presumption
is that parties do not intend to indemnify the indemnitee against its
own negligence, specific contractual language should not be required
before a court should infer a different intent.
Until the summer of 1981, both admiralty and state courts, with
a few exceptions, had determined that the freedom of parties to con-
tract outweighed the policy that one should not be allowed contrac-
tually to shift his liability to another. New legislation in Louisiana,
however, applicable to contracts on fixed offshore platforms, has
created a significant distinction between maritime contractual indem-
nity and Louisiana contractual indemnity.
131. Id. at 1292.
132. LA. R.S. 9:2780 (Supp. 1981). See text at notes 135 & 136, infra.
133. The platform owner may be able to shift its liability under a theory of tort
indemnity. This, however, can occur only through operation of law and cannot be con-
tractually provided for.
134. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1945.
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Act 427 of the 1981 Louisiana Legislature
Act 427 of the 1981 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature1"
legislatively overruled cases such as Cole, Dickerson, and Hicks. An
owner of an offshore platform no longer may invoke the principles
of contractual interpretation traditionally applied in Louisiana to deter-
mine whether he is owed indemnification against his own negligence
or fault. Agreements between parties to contracts affecting the energy
industry are absolutely void when they provide for indemnity against
the indemnitee's sole or concurrent fault." An analysis of the perti-
nent provisions will assist in assessing the legislation's impact on
future jurisprudence.
Paragraph (A) is a statement of legislative intent. The legislature
determined that an inequity was being fostered upon "certain con-
tractors and their employees"'37 by defense or indemnity provisions
in contracts pertaining to the energy industry. Thus, to protect these
contractors, the provisions are declared absolutely void as against
public policy in Louisiana when the provision requires either defense
or indemnification for negligence or strict liability'" on the part of
the indemnitee. The underlying contract, however, is still enforceable."
Paragraph (B) implements the intent of the legislature provided
in paragraph (A).' 4 The prohibition is limited to indemnification against
losses arising out of actions for personal injuries and wrongful death,
and does not affect indemnity agreements for injury to property.
Paragraph (C) defines the term "agreement" as including
agreements as to all conceivable services involved in operations
135. LA. R.S. 9:2780 (Supp. 1981).
136. This is consistent with LA. CIv. CODE art. 12, which provides: "Whatever is done
in contravention of a prohibitory law, is void, although the nullity be not formally
directed."
137. LA. R.S. 9:2780(A).
138. As indemnification is not allowed for the strict liability of the indemnitee,
the indemnitee will be liable even for the negligent acts of contractors providing ser-
vices for the platform if the ruin of the platform results. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365
So. 2d 1285; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2322.
139. LA. R.S. 9:2780(A).
140.
Any agreement contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement pertain-
ing to a well for oil, gas or water, or drilling for minerals which occur in a solid,
liquid, gaseous, or other state, is void and unenforceable to the extent that it
purports to or does provide for defense or indemnity, or either, to the indem-
nitee against loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting from death
or bodily injury to persons which is caused by or results from the sole or concur-
rent negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee, or an agent, employee,
or an independent contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee.
LA. R.S. 9:2780(B).
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relating to the exploration, development, production, or transporta-
tion of oil, gas, water, or minerals in any form. The enumeration is
illustrative rather than exclusive and specifically includes the fur-
nishing or rental of equipment and transportation. The word "agree-
ment" in this paragraph refers to the underlying contract rather than
the indemnity provision.
Paragraph (D) provides that the act will not affect the validity
of any insurance contract, except as otherwise provided in the act,
or any workmens' compensation benefits. Also, the owner or usufruc-
tuary of a surface estate can still seek indemnity from one conduc-
ting operations for the exploration or production of minerals on the
owner's land.
Paragraphs (E) and (F) enumerate the exceptions to the legislative
prohibition. Timber companies and public utilities are excluded to the
extent that they are not involved in the production of oil and gas.
Additionally, bodily injury resulting from radioactivity or from the
performance of services to control wild wells... may be subject to an
indemnity agreement.
Paragraph (G) contemplates a situation in which a company seeks
to protect itself from liability through the means of the service con-
tractor's insurance policy.'42 The prohibitions of this act may not be
circumvented by requiring an agreement to waive subrogation, by add-
ing named insureds on the insurance endorsements, or by any other
form of insurance protection. Agreements in insurance policies
attempting to accomplish the same effect as a contractual provision
requiring a contractor to hold harmless a negligent indemnitee are
void.
Paragraph (H) permits a person who has conveyed land but reserved
a mineral servitude to secure indemnity from a party conducting
exploration or production operations for minerals. However, he may
not seek indemnity if he has retained a working interest in the
minerals.
Paragraph (I) addresses the problem of master service agreements,
which are common in the industry. In a master service agreement,
the company and the contractor agree that the contract shall govern
all work between and delineate the obligations of the parties during
the term of the agreement. The company, however, is not obligated
141. "Wild wells" are wells which for various reasons have gone out of control.
Containing these wells is very dangerous and the parties, therefore, still are allowed
to allocate loss between themselves.
142. The Ninth Circuit has allowed this means of protection in a maritime case.
Price v. Zim-Israel, 616 F.2d 422. See text at note 85, supra.
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to offer employment to the contractor, and the contractor is not
obligated to accept offers from the company. The agreement merely
governs in the event that employment is offered and accepted. The
act purports to apply to these agreements, except when they were
executed before the effective date of the act and govern a terminable
performance of a specified service. Arguably, there may be an un-
constitutional impairment of contracts when the act prevents the par-
ties to a master service agreement from shifting potential liability
for the indemnitee's negligence to the indemnitor. The company,
however, will still have the choice not to offer employment to that
contractor.
Through Act 427, Louisiana law now deviates substantially from
the federal approach to indemnity agreements in maritime contracts.
Oil companies may not contract away their fault, and when the
negligent act of a contractor triggers a situation which results in the
platform owner being held strictly liable, the owner will have to bear
the burden of the loss.4 3
Act 427 is intended to apply as federal law to fixed offshore plat-
forms beyond three miles, as prescribed by the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act.1'4 Although different treatment is accorded those contracts
made to be performed on vessels, an equal protection argument of-
fered by the owners of the platforms will probably be unsuccessful.
A similar argument, offered in Smith v. Falcon Seaboard, Inc.,"5 failed.
A widow claimed that provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act violated the equal protection clause 4 and were imper-
missibly discriminatory. The Act restricted recovery available to
workers assigned to platforms to that offered by the LHWCA, yet
made no restriction on the recovery available to the workers assigned
to vessels. The court, however, held that mobility of situs is not
143. See Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So.2d 1285.
144. State law is applied as federal law on artificial islands on the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf, but only when there is no applicable federal law. Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act S 203(a), 43 U.S.C. S 1333(2)(A) (Supp. 1981). The Fifth Circuit has recently
held that exploration for and production of oil and gas from the ocean bottom has
become a maritime activity. Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 664 F.2d 463, 466
(5th Cir. 1981); Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 1981). Fixed plat-
forms experience many of the same perils of the sea that vessels experience, and they
are used for the development of oil and gas, a maritime activity. Boudreaux and Pip-
pen may indicate a movement toward recognition of these fixed platforms as struc-
tures that should be governed by maritime law. Because there already exists federal
law on the subject of maritime indemnity agreements, the federal common law would
preempt the application of LA. R.S. 9:2780.
145. 463 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1085.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
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an arbitrary criterion and the complaint would be better handled by
Congress than the courts.147 The same result can be anticipated in
the event a fixed platform owner protests the fact that a vessel owner
can contract away his liability while he, engaged in the same hazar-
dous activities, may not.
The United States Supreme Court has held that fixed offshore
platforms beyond three miles off the coast of Louisiana are federal
enclaves or islands rather than vessels, and thus are deserving of treat-
ment similar to that granted land contracts.' Most jurisprudence,
however, has treated maritime and land-based indemnity agreements
similarly."9 Now, as fixed offshore platforms are isolated by the new
legislation which is carefully tailored to predominantly affect them,
the federal enclaves in the Gulf of Mexico will more and more become
islands, for they will receive a unique treatment that neither maritime
nor Louisiana contracts receive.
Conclusion
In our original hypothetical, a welder made three contracts. In
his first contract, he agreed to perform services on a submersible plat-
form in the Gulf of Mexico. He specifically agreed to indemnify the
owner for claims arising out of the performance of the job, even for
injuries resulting from the indemnitee's fault. The admiralty courts
would uphold the contract as it contained clear and unambiguous
language. Even without the express indemnity agreement, if the in-
jured employee was not covered by the LHWCA, the admiralty courts
may have found that the welding contractor owed indemnity based
upon an implied warranty of workmanlike performance.
The second contract, for the performance of welding services on
a fixed drilling platform beyond three miles, is controlled by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act. Since the passage of Act 427 of 1981,
this agreement for indemnity would be considered void. Clear and
unequivocal language is immaterial since the parties may not, through
their contracts, derogate from public policy. The courts also have
precluded indemnification based upon an implied warranty of
workmanlike performance, as they declined to extend the vessel-
stevedore indemnity rule to contracts between fixed platform owners
and contractors.
Louisiana law also would govern the third contract, but the in-
demnity provision would be upheld as the work was unrelated to the
147. 463 F.2d at 208.
148. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. at 355.
149. See text at notes 53 & 103, supra.
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energy industry. The language is clear and unequivocal: the talismanic
word of "fault," inclusive of "negligence," is present, as required by
the Fifth Circuit. The presumption against the intention of indemni-
fying against the indemnitee's fault is thereby overcome.
Determining the law which will govern a given contract is im-
perative. The rules employed to reach the results vary under maritime
and Louisiana law, and the results themselves often will differ. The
discrepancy in treatment, however, is not always supported by solid
reasoning.
A moveable drilling platform is a vessel, while a fixed drilling
platform is not. This difference results in one contract being controlled
by maritime law and the other by Louisiana law. The people affected by
the choice of law which governs the indemnity agreements are not the
workers, but the parties to the contract-the owner of the rig and the
contractor. There is no logical basis for a result where the contractor
will be liable for contractual indemnity on the vessel but not on the fixed
offshore rig.
The passage of the new legislation in Louisiana has made the
discrepancy in treatment most significant. Now, the artificial islands
are treated in a unique way while maritime and Louisiana contracts
unrelated to the energy industry are treated similarly. The pockets
of jurisdiction- should be redistributed so that vessels and artificial
islands will be subject to different law only when such difference is
founded upon a rational relationship to the nature of the transaction
involved.
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